Ukraine. The war and the history.

This is from my column written at the end of 2013, when the events were rolling up and eventually lead to the curent crisiss. 

[Ukrainian President] Viktor Yanukovych's refusal [2013] to sign an association with the EU under the Eastern Partnership programme is spoken of as a "victory" for Russia. Of course, it was a victory. Only a victory with an unpleasant aftertaste. Because the “victory” of one is the defeat of the other.

Here in Europe, both French and English commentators agree: Ukraine's retreat is a Moscow's victory. True, they also talk about “strategic patience”. As they say, 'the process is still going on'.

Why is the Eastern Partnership, proposed by the Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski, causing such rejection in Moscow? In addition to today's considerations, there is also an old, deep-seated one.

"Poland" and "Lithuania" — Польша, Литва — in the Russian mass consciousness, have long acquired a mythical meaning, the image of the enemy on the western borders. But where is this from? 

Well, yes, for Mayakovsky, in 1920s, Poland was “geographical news”. There was also the Livonian War, Gogol's Taras Bulba fighting with the Poles, then the partitions of Poland and the “Polish question” that remained after all that. The older, statist Pushkin wrote a poem 'To the Slanderers of Russia' about the suppression of the uprising of the Poles against the Russian empire. To the critics in France he said: do not interfere, this is our internal, Slavic family business.

At home, we are accustomed to one reading of our history — the Moscow reading, without even noticing it. There was a Kievan Rus, then the feudal fragmentation, then the Moscow principality began to “collect lands” and so on up to the empire and the USSR. 

One long Summer evening I was talking about modern politics with an old school friend, who by that time had gone into big politics. The chatter turned to history. 

My friend suddenly asked: Where did Ukraine and Belarus come from? There's nothing in our history?We had Kievan Rus, then the feudal fragmentation, the principalities... Then, suddenly, in a leap, Moscow “gathers” Russian lands, fights with Lithuania and Poland. And between that, what? 

Where were Ukraine and Belarus?

But it was not only Moscow that 'collected' Russian lands. And the 'Russian lands' in question didn’t always want to “get collected”. 

“Lithuania”, for example, was not the one state that is now [2013] holding the summit. The old 'Litva', or Lithuania was multinational, multi-confessional, with Orthodox, Catholics, Muslims left over from the Tartar-Mongol “yoke”, and Jews, who fled to Lithuania from persecution in Western Europe, engulfed in religious wars. The state was fully called the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Rusian (with one s) and Zhomoytsky. 

The state stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea. In addition to Lithuania, it included modern Belarus, part of modern Ukraine, Russia and Moldova. The state (administrative) language in the principality was Russian, more precisely Western Russian (or Old Belarusian). All office work was carried out in it, all legal documents were written in Russian and the early printer Francis Skoryna (Francysk Skaryna) put this on the cover of the Bible he printed — "Библия руска" - “The Russian Bible”. 

Later on Lithuania united with Poland in what was to be called the Confederation or the Commonwealth. The name is a reverse translation into the languages ​​of the state of the time of the expression 'res publica' — a common cause, a republic. Later, in our time, historians agreed to call that polity the Commonwealth. However, in the Russian mythological consciousness, the enemy remained as "Poland".

From Muscovite Russia, which built the state on the principles of the 'vertical of power', the Western Russian Commonwealth was different in that it had an elected head of state (the king was elected), a parliament, an autonomy of city self-government and a religious tolerance. The Commonwealth ceased to exist only in 1795, with the 'third partition of Poland'.

You say, it was a long time ago! And a lot of things happened since, and now we have completely different interests at work. But no, isn't a commonwealth, an alliance of friends, more attractive than an empire? 

The drift of Eastern European countries towards the commonwealth, even if it is now the European Union, is also a drift away from the empires. The ghost of “Lithuania” wanders around Europe, it still attracts.

It is difficult to part with an empire, especially the one in our mind. This one battle with Kiev can be won, but will the European drift stop there?

Vladimir Putin once remarked that England would never part with her Empire. And the recent “non-statement” by Dmitry Peskov about England as a “small island” completely stung the British. The Prime Minister delivered a fiery speech in defence of the English heritage, including even the fact that all sports were invented by the British. The country laughed, people compared it with the speech of Prime Minister Hugh Grant in the film 'Love, Actually', also about heritage, from Shakespeare to Harry Potter and Beckham's left foot.

So the empire was not just dismantled, but moved on to the Commonwealth of Nations, now even without the "British". Fifty-three states, both large and small. Moreover, even some of those who were not colonies of the British Empire had asked to join and were included, eg the former Portuguese Mozambique and the former Belgian Rwanda. One can underestimate the influence of this community, one can overestimate iIn Russia, hardly anyone follows it closely. But there is an influence, and a membership in the "family of peoples" is valued. 

The attraction remains. Apartheid in South Africa collapsed not least because the country was put outside the Commonwealth. In Pakistan, democratic change was stimulated by the fact that the Commonwealth expelled the country for a military coup. Thatcher fell out with Reagan when the Imperial US invaded the little Grenada in 1983 because it suddenly decide to have a communist government. After the event, Thatcher refused to talk to Reagan at all for a long time. They almost ruined the Russian perestroika! And take India, the former "pearl in the British crown", it remains the biggest democracy in the world.

In terms of economics, it has been estimated that, on average, one Commonwealth member trades with another 50 percent more than with a non-member country. Yes, and in Britain itself there is a movement to develop and strengthen the Commonwealth instead of EU membership.

The Soviet Commonwealth, the CIS, has stayed as a leftover of the Soviet empire. Perhaps, it it were less of an empire and more of a commonwealth, there would be no need to win “battles”. Talk, don't fight.

This column was also published in my blog "Like in Europe" on the BFM.ru portal. Texts may vary. 

Putin's changes don't matter.

Putin has proposed constitutional changes. 

A power shift from presidency to a little known body. 

Gorbachev was planning a shift in power from the Communist party to his newly formed presidential administration. It didn't end well. 

Government resignation and Mishustin's appointment don't matter, shouldn't be in the main news&

Any Questions? No Questions! Вопросы есть? Вопросов нет!

(fine tuning your Russian)

Muireann Maguire posted this on her Facebook page —

I was rather touched by this email between some of our second-year students on a Russian culture model, showing their determination to proceed with a seminar on the topic of "народ" [people] despite the strike (also showing a blissful innocence of the use of the genitive plural, but one can't have everything):

***Привет народ, [hi, people]

We'd like to ask everyone to still turn up to the seminar (BYOB) (preferably vodka) as Muireann may still be on strike at 09:30 on Tuesday for fun discussions on the readings attached about the народ and other related subjects. If you have any other interesting sources then please bring them along to discuss.

Есть вопросы?

Нет вопросы. До свидания 

X, Y, Z, and Putin***

(I've removed the students' names above, but I left their rather surprising celebrity guest, Putin; I suppose those Russian spybots get everywhere, even Exeter's VLE).

Thanks, Muireann!

There's more here than a slight confusion on the plural genitive. The famous phrase "Вопросы есть? Вопросов нет!" comes from "The White Sun of the Desert", a cult film of the 70-s. Ever since its release the phrase has been current in modern Russian.

So, people (народ), inverse your word order. Or else!

Here is the clip (full movie available on YouTube) -

Fishing, Putin style.

The press and social networks are awash with images of topless Vladimir Putin fishing in Siberia with his Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu, a native of Tywa, the republic where they went on a holiday trip.

But why do Putin's image-makers persist with this particular bit, the fishing? This time, including the underwater chase after a pike? One explanation could be that they have in mind the macho man James Bond fighting the baddies underwater in the 1965 'Thunderball' with Sean Connery. (wiki on the film)

To the giggling Russians, the idea of going on a fishing trip inevitably evokes the cult 1960s comedy 'The Diamond Hand' with a staged fishing episode, when one crook is scuba-diving with a net full of live fish that he puts on the hook and the second is on shore supposedly ready to knock out the 'target.' It all backfires. (wiki on the film)

The phrase, that every Russian knows, 'клёв будет такой, что он забудет обо всём на светe' — 'the fish will be biting so often that he will forget about everything' is also from  that film.

Here is the episode —



And here is the 'Thunderball' sequence —

Baba Yaga the Beautiful.

As the West is so furiously debating whether it is morally acceptable to have Putin as an ally in the fight against terrorism, one lovely blogger declares her love for the wicked witch of Russian fairy tales.

The wicked (but sometimes good, as in this tale, in Russian) witch Baba Yaga is one of the main recurring characters in traditional Russian lore. Another is Vassilissa the Beautiful, who sometimes also appears as Vassilissa the Wise.


This Australian vlogger is talking about her fascination with Baba Yaga, but if you wished to imagine what Vassilissa the Beautiful could look like, that's her, The Raven of Poe.

Read an earlier post about Baba Yaga (The Guardian about a new book of fairy tales) here.

New Censorship in Russia

(From Censoring to Constructing the Agenda: on the current state of Russian media)

Who is controlling and directing Russian media today? How and to what degree such control is being executed? A general idea may be derived from various episodes and comments but a joined up picture of how separate media stories develop and link up with more general lines in propaganda and with underlying ideology needs specialist study. From the false story of the ‘crucified little boy’ in Ukraine to ‘gayrope’ ('gay Europe') and to an anti-American interpretation of the idea of a ‘monopolar’ world, is there a coordinating centre, a media politbureau where ideas, arguments and clichés are coined and then spread throughout a seemingly diverse media?

Vasiliy Gatov, a Russian journalist, media manager and researcher, has published an article on the development of new censorship in post-Soviet Russia. The article, entitled ‘Putin, Maria Ivanovna from Ivanovo and Ukrainians on the Telly’, is on academia.edu and Radio Liberty sites. (In English here and in Russian here.) 

Tetradki recommend this study to all those who are interested in how Russian public discourse is developing, the role of the press and the situation within the media. Gatov gave us permission to republish a few excerpts from his article. (Translation by Arch Tait.)

Censorship returns (90s to naughties) 

When in 1991-2 the old “Soviet” newspapers collided with the economic difficulties of the time, they rushed for assistance to the very president and government they so relentlessly criticised. Izvestiya, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Trud, Argumenty i Fakty and other publications which regarded themselves as “the foremen on Perestroika’s building site” pointed to the “duty of the State to promote freedom of speech”, and demanded they should be paid for providing support during the turbulent events of those years. Boris Yeltsin’s Administration decided to oblige and, for example, awarded the editors, many of whom were members of parliament, premises on a “gratuitous use” basis. [...] The foundations for future adverse changes were thereby laid, in the form, on the one hand, of politically motivated privileges and, on the other, of a deliberate intermixing of journalists with the political and economic elite. Government subsidising of the media began very early, and was to became one of the cornerstones of the New Censorship.‘

Gleb Pavlovsky [a leading media strategist and advisor in the 90s] claims that, already in summer 1996, the Foundation for Effective Politics proposed that the concept of media management should be, not a short-term emergency measure to get round the election problem [Russian presidential elections in 1996, narrowly won by Boris Yeltsyn - Ed.], but a permanent policy of the Presidential Administration. More detailed proposals were made in 1997 when information wars between the oligarchs’ media empires were at their height.

The coming of Vladimir Putin to the Kremlin in summer 1999 required another media mobilisation. The individual chosen as Yeltsin’s heir was not a well-known politician. Indeed, his public profile was all but non-existent. Quite when Yeltsin would decide to step down nobody knew. They prepared to rally round at a moment’s notice. There were teams of officials, spin doctors and creative executives in the Presidential Administration and, crucially, around it, at the ready to solve the problem. 

The nature of the Friday policy planning meetings changed at this time, and directors of the main television channels began being invited to attend. At first the meetings were chaired personally by Alexander Voloshin, director of the Presidential Administration, but the job later passed to Alexey Gromov who was first Putin’s press secretary, then deputy head of the Administration. From 2000 to 2008 there were also “Surkov planning meetings”, especially where the activities of the United Russia party or regional policy were concerned. If “Gromov meetings” were essentially coordination of the week’s agenda and the apportioning of responsibilities between the key information channels, “Surkov meetings” were, according to those present at them, effectively a dictating of required content. 

The “Gromov meetings” created a new in-group of media managers linked by the fact of being allowed to attend them. After NTV was brought to heel, the channel’s new management were also invited to the Friday meetings, and in 2006 the conclave was extended to include Margarita Simonyan [of Novosti Press Agency] and the managers of REN TV and TVTsentr. 

Fundamental to the New Censorship was the post-communist personal loyalty of editors, key journalists and professional groups, and that was delivered by Gromov and [Mikhail] Lesin. [former Minister of the Press, President’s adviser and up until recently chief of Gazprommedia group - ed.]

“Redaction No.6”: open vs secret management

In late April 2000, at the height of the presidential election campaign, a document came into the possession of Veronika Kutsyllo, head of the political section of the magazine Kommersant-Vlast’ (Kommersant-Government). The headline writers of [Kommersant] Publishers promptly baptised it “Version 6”. [In the Russian original - “Редакция N 6”, an obvious allusion to Chekhov’s 1892 short story ‘Ward No.Six’ about a lunatic asylum where constructed reality clashes with real life. ‘Палата номер шесть’ - Ward No.Six is used figuratively in Russian to describe a place or a situation bordering on insane. - Ed.]  Gleb Pavlovsky, at the time more than close to the Kremlin’s politics, responded to a request to reminisce about Version 6 with a mixed memoir. On the one hand, he said, he had doubts about the document’s provenance; a little later, however, he added he could remember that kind of language being used and the details, but could not put a name to the authors. 

Version 6 hypothesises that the future administration of President Putin will live in a situation where there needs to be a distinction between overt and covert policy. Overt policy will declare adherence to the norms of the Constitution, law, international obligations and political standards. The covert component will almost completely restore the ideological and organisational control of every element of civil society.

“The moral state of society,” its anonymous authors write, “currently rules out any direct statements or actions by the president of the Russian Federation and his Administration aimed at suppression of the opposition and its leaders, or gaining control of the media and communication of news. Accordingly, the designers of the present programme identify as a key tactic that the political department of the President of the Russian Federation should adopt a dual approach to accomplishing its tasks: one official and overt, the other covert.” 

Among the covert tasks, Version 6 identifies gaining control of the media and journalists. It proposes, for example, under the auspices of the political department:  

— “To influence the activity of the media ... by collecting and making use of special information on the conduct of each media outlet’s commercial and political activities, its personnel, those managing its organisations, its sources of finance, economic, material and technological resources, formal and informal contacts, financial partners, etc.; 

— “To influence the work of journalists ... by collecting and making use of special information on the conduct of their professional journalistic, commercial and political activities, sources of financial support, place of work, formal and informal contacts, financial and personal partners and others.” 

Even more blatant is the authors’ proposal of two approaches to working with the media. The first should see the setting up of an agency (making use of the Administration’s resources) to investigate, accumulate and process information obtained and recycle it to the public “appropriately retouched”. The second approach would be to “induce a financial crisis in opposition media, or media sympathetic to the opposition, rescind their licences and certificates, and create conditions under which their operations became either manageable by the state or impossible.” 

Intervention intensifies

“In 2005, the practice of managing the media in Russia achieved a stable form that has survived almost unaltered until the present time. The model has proved effective, and even able to adapt to progressive (at least in technical terms) trends. And the system has been obliged to evolve: having felt its way to the levers of power in the field of news coverage, it went on to begin intervening in the news agenda. The system has also been forced to extend its reach from traditional media to the “new media”, from broadcasting and the press to the interactive sphere, from a domestic agenda to an international agenda. 

The system has to operate in an environment where, on paper, the laws ban the practice of censorship. The interests of the censorship system, however, coincide with the interests of the political establishment: to ensure maximum conservation and maximum survival of the existing model, irrespective of what justifications may be put forward at a particular moment by its leader. These can be, as in 2000-2015, “countering terrorism”, “constructing a pyramid of power”, “innovational development”, and even “spiritual supports”. The mission of the New Censorship is to change the agenda in such a way that a substantial majority of the public support the accompanying ideas, regardless of their opinion yesterday or today in respect of their local, professional or social agenda. 

Insiders and outsiders

Svetlana Mironyuk, chief editor of the Novosti News Agency in 2003-2013, characterises the period: “[...] From the outset of the 2000s, the authorities distinguished three broad categories: foes (Vedomosti, Forbes, Gazeta.ru, Lenta.ru, and a few others (most recently Rain / Dozhd’). There was no point in asking foes to do the Kremlin any favours, or to ask them to refrain from doing something. With them, as with the Western media, there was either a brisk, business-like relationship or no relationship at all. 

Then, there were friends: the state-owned media, although the warmth of the friendship varied greatly. Initially, for instance, there was respect for Vitaliy Ignatenko at ITAR-TASS and he was not particularly pressured. Konstantin Ernst [at Channel One] always occupied a special niche. Friends included Komsomolskaya Pravda and its editor, Vladimir Sungorkin, who were outwardly independent. There was Interfax and [its head] Mikhail Komissar. Later, “friends through thick and thin” included Aram Gabrelyanov [head of Izvestia and News Media group which owns LifeNews, a popular internet and TV news outfit. - Ed.]. In terms of his degree of intimacy with the Kremlin, Sungorkin was always a closer confidant than I [Mironyuk] was. It was all a matter of personal chemistry between Gromov and his group, and the editors, as well as a bit of horse-trading. “We’ll put an exclusive interview your way, and you can do us a favour in return.” 

Finally, the third category were the half-friends, or half-foes. Initially, that list included Kommersant, Moskovsky Komsomolets and Echo of Moscow radio [Russian original also includes Argumenty i Fakty in this list. - Ed.]; that is, people you might be able to do a deal with, but not always. 

A return of direct line

In addition, in 2004-2005 one further crucial element of governmental media management appeared. Mironyuk notes, “Some time around 2002, before I [was appointed to Novosti], Lesin wired up himself and all the editors-in-chief of state-owned media with a direct, dedicated cable. [Such direct lines existed in Soviet times and were refered too as ‘vertushka’. - Ed.] A line was laid specially from the Ministry of the Press in Moscow on Strastnoy Boulevard to all the editorial offices. That was done by Koryavov, who was deputy minister at the time. Then, in 2004-2005, for all the output [to news desks - Ed.] of agencies and television a special cable was installed on the closed ATS-2 network. This was a one-way yellow telephone without a dial which could only receive calls. [At present] all these non-dialling telephones go straight back to Alexey Gromov’s office. This is now the main mechanism for managing the media. [...] 

Manufactured reality

The main innovation during the latest period of the New Censorship has been a clampdown in the government-control media, especially television, on any generation of their own news agenda. Russia, as understood by the “collective Putin”, or as those who for the time being are his loyal lieutenants would like to see it, does not need real news. On the contrary, the only tool used for managing imperfect Russian society is a manufactured news agenda which is literally stamped into the minds of the public by the TV channels. 

The New Censorship does not merely exclude real events from the news agenda: it replaces them with simulated communications whose purpose is to create in viewers a sense of dependency on the principal hero in the stories. Even during the Ukrainian crisis, the model has not been modified, except that the “pole” [thrust - Ed.] of the messages has been changed [...]

[...] secondment [of members of the media team of the Presidential Administration - Ed.] certainly goes on, and many of the texts read out on Vesti (News) or Vremya (Time) are aired, or appear on the websites of the channels, without any involvement of the channels’ editors. And indeed if, after all the filtering of staff that has gone on, editors were permitted to correct the artistic efforts of that faceless “creative team in the Administration”, things would only get worse. A distinguishing feature of the New Censorship is that it encourages journalists (the word should probably be in quotes) not only to serve up the news agenda they are handed by the Kremlin, but also to creatively embellish it themselves.

[...] The authentic, natural, real news agenda has not disappeared, it is just excluded from the “reality” communicated to Russia’s citizens. 

Image: a drawing by A.Anichkin, after The Girl with an Oar statue by Ivan Shadr, one of the symbols of Russia, albeit sardonic.

The Great Genby.

A little fun with new Russian.

Genby.
Photo: www.kremlin.ru

Digital age and and a country open to outside world created entirely new ways for language creativity.

Take this, for example. Switching from one language to another also requires, when writing, switching your keyboard settings. In the case of Russian, switching from Latin alphabet to Cyrillic. Many Russians soon discovered that typing in Russian when the keyboard is switched to English creates quite a few fun words. And vice versa.

If you type 'Dear' to start a formal letter, in Cyrillic it becomes 'Вуфк' that sounds Woofk. A nonsense word that doesn't mean anything but sounds onomatopoeic both in Russian and in English with 'oof' and 'уф' interjections as the most obvious. Russian 'oof' has the same meaning as in English. I have a friend with whom we use 'Вуфк' as a regular greeting in correspondence.

If you touch-type Putin in Russian with the standard Cyrillic фыва-олдж keyboard in mind but with the Qwerty layout switched on, the name becomes Genby. It is now becoming an internet meme in its own right.

And the most popular reverse word that sprung from the switched keyboard phenomenon is ЗЫ. ZY, pronounced z-yee with the hard Russian ы sound, is nothing but PS, a postscript. But it also has an added weight of introducing a punch line, an ironic or sarcastic conclusion to one's blog post or a social network update. Probably because it sounds similar to 'гы', a Russian interjection, expressing impish glee.

Every time Putin opens his mouth...

...America gets five students of Russian

Alexander Genis, a Russian-American writer, has been to the Summer meet of the language students and professors at Middlebury College, Vermont. Novaya Gazeta published his thoughful report on what is going on with Russian studies in America. 

He has a word or two to say about Solzhenitsyn, the most famous Russian who had lived in Vermont, and many more on Robert Frost, much loved and translated in Russia.

I found two passages from Genis’ article especially interesting, and amusing too.

At one of the workshops Genis asked postgarduate students to name their favourite Russian ‘book.’

...I cautiously walked into an auditorium to see postgradute students, who didn’t look at all like philologists. The girls were pretty and none had glasses, the boys were big and muscular.

“What is your favorite Russian book,” I asked, to open the discussion.

“The Lady with the Dog,” said one girl.

“The Lady with the Dog,” echoed another.

“The Lady with the Dog,” agreed a boy.

“Geopolitics of Russia,” coldly said another, with a crew cut.

“OK,” I said. And, realising I have used an English borrowing, quickly added an awkward Russian “Ladnen’ko.”  (Note: ладненько, from ладно)

I wholeheartedly support the majority choice. Chekhov’s short story is my favorite too, even if it’s not quite a ‘book.’ The force of what Genis is saying is revealed in another striking passage on President Putin’s contribution to the promotion of Russian abroad.

I haven’t been here for ten years and immediately noticed the change for the better. In the number of students, Russian summer school outshone both Chinese and Arabic. 

When I complimented one of the professors, he replied: “What do you want? Every time Putin opens his mouth we get five more students. The tide changed at the time of the Georgian war and grows stronger with each, so to speak, exotic law or, shall we say, judicial trial.

“Slavonics," we sighed, "is the daughter of the cold war. We should be glad that it’s only cold.”

The Russian version of this article is here,

The Novaya Gazeta article is here, 

Read The Lady with the Dog by Chekhov here (Constance Garnett translation), 

Wikipedia article about Alexander Genis here, 

Middlebury College summer language programmes here.

As Obama cancels the summit with Putin... (a comic.)

One of my many hats is graphic design. Here's a recent exercise in #Apple's #iWork with additional help from #ComicLife.

Contact the editor (me) if you want to commission similar. For description of techniques used and tutorials read the blog I Work in Pages.

You can read more in my new book 'iWork for Mac OSX Cookbook' (2012), follow me on Twitter at iworkinpages, like my page I Work in Pages on Facebook and add me to your circles on Google+.

The Tale of Putin and the Pike.

(Russian cultural references).

Fisherman and the Golden Fish.
Illustration by Ivan Bilibin.

President Putin's most recent outdoor exploit in Southern Siberia when he caught a 20 kilogamm pike caused disbelief and widely circulated jokes.

Putin, accompanied by the Prime-Minister Medvedev and the Minister of Defence Shoigu, was fishing on a lake in Tuva, a Russian Federation republic on the border with Mongolia. In one of the photos with his pike, Putin seems to be talking to the fish or kissing her.

Some claimed that the pike in photos shouldn't have been more than 12 kg. The Kremlin insisted that the weighing was genuine. The long-standing British record for a pike is 21 kg 234 g.

Others simply rolled their eyes — no, not another one! Putin previously flew on a micro-light with a flock of  storks, chased whales on a speedboat, shot a Siberian tiger with a tranquiliser, and, most hilariously, 'discovered' a cache of Greek amphoras while diving in the Black Sea.

The pike episode is special in that it evokes numerous cultural references in Russia. All of them derisive.

One is the popular folk tale of The Simpleton Yemelya and the Pike (a version in English here and in Russian here). Yemelya, the lazy third son of a peasant, refuses to do any work at home or in the fields except when bribed by 'presents'. One Winter, he goes to fetch some water in an ice-hole on the river and catches a pike in his bucket there. The pike, being a magical creature, asks him to let her (or him in some versions) go, and promises that any of Yemelya's wish will be fulfilled if he adds to it a short incantation: "по щучьему велению, по моему хотению" — 'on the pike's behest and on my request.' Yemelya goes on to marry the tsar's daughter and later on becomes the tsar himself.

The 'moral' of the tale seems strange or absent at first, but only if you forget that many folk tales have a reverse message, that is they tell you what not to do or not to expect to happen. In Russian language, the phrase 'on pike's behest' is often used to mock wishful thinking or empty boastfulness.

The second reference is to Pushkin's tale in verse "Сказка о рыбаке и рыбке" (The Tale of the Fisherman and the Fish, Robert Chandler's version in English here and in Russian here, wiki about the tale). The tale uses the plot of the Brothers Grimm Vom Fischer und seiner Frau (in Russian here) but while many of the Grimms' tales are well-known in Russia this one is better known  in Pushkin's rendition.

The old fisherman lives in a mud hut by the sea with his wife whose only possession is a разбитое корыто (broken trough). One day her goes to the sea and catches a goldfish who talks to him in human language and, again, as in the tale about Yemelya, asks him to let her go. The old man, charmed by the beauty and gentleness of the sea creature, lets her go. But the fish-wife scolds him and makes him go back to the sea to ask the goldfish for a log cabin. The fish, who turns out to be the Queen of the Sea, turns the mud hut into a log cabin. The fish-wife wants more and more with all her demands granted. Until one day when she is deciding that she wants to rule the Sea herself. After which the Goldfish has had enough and everything returns to where it was, the mud hut and the broken trough.

Остаться у разбитого корыта — to be left by the broken trough became an idiom which means to be no better off than before, to be left with nothing, or to be back where one started.

And the third reference is "Бриллиантовая рука" (The Diamond Arm, wiki here), Leonid Gaidai's 1969 comedy. If it isn't a number one then it certainly is in the top ten of the most loved Russian/Soviet films. Every Russian-speaking person knows it practically by heart and almost every line went into the language as an idiom.

The plot turns around a gang of smugglers whose latest shipment of gold and diamonds from abroad has, by accident, landed in the cast on the supposedly broken arm of an unintended man, Semyon Semyonovich (played by the famous comedian Yuri Nikulin). Nikulin reports the incident to the police, and they decide to use him as live bait to catch the criminals.  The crooks, one of whom befriends Nikulin, didn't realise that Nikulin saw the treasure being hidden inside the cast, and go on trying, unsuccessfully,  to lure him into a series of traps to get the cast off him. Now, in one such attempt, Nikulin and his 'friend' go on a fishing trip to a remote place. Nikulin, an experienced angler, doesn't believe there's fish there, but is promised that "клёв будет такой, что ты забудешь всё на свете" (the fish will be biting so much that уou'll forget everything). Because another, scuba diving crook, is sitting at the bottom of the sea with a netful of live fish and hooking them on as soon as Nikulin throws in the line.

The staged fishing success that makes the fisherman 'forget everything in the world' is being remembered now and repeated in connection with Putin's pike, genuine or not.

There's the triple counter-punch for you, fire the PR.

The Diamond Arm with English subtitles. The fishing episode comes at 44th minute into the film.



In this 1957 Soviet cartoon version of Yemelya and the Pike there is an added motive of Yemelya beating the foreign princes, defeating an invading army and the tsar deciding to emigrate abroad. (bad syncing)


  

Ksenia Turkova and Alexei Mikheev. Russian language resources.

I'd like to recommend two resources on modern Russian language.

The first is the Russian linguist Alexei Mikheev's (Алексей Михеев) website "Словари XXI века. Клуб ценителей русского языка" (Dictionaries of the 21st Century, the Russian language appreciation club). The website aggregates news items, commentary and analysis on new trends, usage and cultural references in modern Russian.

Mikheev also runs an active Facebook group "Словарь года" (Dictionary of the Year) where he and other members pick new words, phrases and usages from current news. Discussions are lively, members post links and references. Both the site and the Facebook group are usually up to the point and free from hysterical shouting that infects many forums these days. Based on posts and discussions Mikheev compiles monthly and yearly 'dictionaries' of new words and usages in Russian. Great fun and very informative.

A current discussion focuses on "двушечка", literally 'a little two', or two-kopeck coin. President Putin used the word in relation to the two-year prison sentence for the three members of Pussy Riot, the feminist punk-rock group.

As with other FB groups you need to ask to be accepted as a member.

The second resource is a Moscow News ("Московские новости") regular column on language by Ksenia Turkova (Ксения Туркова). Like Mikheev, Turkova also focuses on new usages and phrases appearing in current news. Her analysis is apt and based on sound linguistic background.

Turkova's columns are widely read and have active commentary threads. Discussions there rarely deteriorate to abuse and threats.

The latest column looks at "двушечка" as an example of cognitive dissonance that has become one of Putin's hallmarks.  

The Noughties. A Russian wrap-up.

Mikhail Yefremov in Citizen Poet.

The Noughties ("Нулевые") is a 70-minute documentary about Russia in the 2000s that is quickly becoming a hit on the internet. It was made by Vadim Vostrov for Krasnoyarsk, East Siberia, regional television company TVK-6 (producer Xenia Cherepanova).

It paints a bleak picture of modern Russia controlled by corrupt bureaucracy who act with complete impunity knowing that Putin will never let them down.

Vostrov follows the rise of the opposition protests since September last year. The collection of politicians, historians, activists, journalists (including The New Yorker's Moscow writer Julia Ioffe), writers and actors who are interviewed in the film seems haphazard at first but towards the end grows into a multi-dimensional picture of vibrant  Russian debate.

Bykov

The film includes extensive interview with one of the top modern writers Zakhar Prilepin and footage of Boris Akunin speaking at protest rallies in Moscow.

One subplot in the film describes the extraordinary success of a Moscow theatre production called Citizen Poet ("Гражданин поэт"). It is, essentially, a reading of poetry, or rather paraphrases of well-known poems by Russian classics written by Dmitry Bykov, a popular journalist and TV presenter. They are all blistering satirical takes on Putin and Medvedev and their publicity stunts. Packed hall bursts out laughing at each new joke, and the performer, Mikhail Yefremov, can't help cracking up himself at times. The production has been seen in theatre by more than 300 thousand people. Citizen Poet was released as series on Echo Moskvy  radio and Dozhd TV channel. YouTube clips of Citizen Poet have been viewed more than 15 million times.

The phrase 'When poets rocked the stadiums' has long become commonplace to describe the phenomenal renaissance of Russian poetry during Khrushchyov's thaw in the late 50s - early 60s. Could it be that now, 50 years later, we may see a new wave?

(The film is in Russian, the subplot about Citizen Poet starts at 1:07:45 into the film, Prilepin's interview is split into short takes throughout the film. Read more about Citizen Poet in this Russian Wikipedia article. Photo of Bykov by Rodrigo Fernandez).

The Parasite of the World

So what's the fuss about Putin calling America 'the parasite of world economy'?

It must be the Word. The word evocating the marxist-bolshevist idea that bankers and lenders are parasites exploiting the rest. I am sure that that was what was on Putin's mind. However, without trying to defend him or anything, I just want to point out that in the same session with student journalists he called America 'one of the main locomotives of world economy' and in reply to a different question, about Russia, said that there was no way she can return to totalitarianism. Simply because it 'doesn't work'.

Here is a long clip of Putin speaking to the youngsters at the Seliger political camp (he answers the question about the US compromise on its debt at 8:15 minutes into the clip, the quote about 'parasitism' is at 9:40 into the video. The reply to the question about totalitarianism is at 5:50 min.):



Parasitism was a criminal offence in the Soviet Union. Article 209 of the Russian Federation's criminal code was only repelled in 1991. The poet Josef Brodsky was sentenced under that article and sent into exile. At the trial he said: 'I do not consider myself a person who leads a parasitic way of life'.


More quotes and references in the Russian version of this post.

Ten Words Not To Be Used in Presence of Mr.Putin

Russian media circulates a list of words to be avoided when speaking to Prime Minister Putin. According to the reports it was put together to drill participants in the meeting with Mr Putin at a youth gathering this summer.

Here is this list:

1. Medvedev (Медведев) - don't mention the President who is seen by many only as figurehead while the Prime Minister wields the real power, or so some would like it to be seen.
2. Money (деньги) - apparently it is not good form to talk money, directly, with a man as important as the Prime Minister.
3. President (президент) - same as no.1. Obama misaddressed Putin as President at their famous 'samovar breakfast' during the US President's visit to Moscow earlier this year.
4. Goszakaz (госзаказ) - literally: state order, a government guaranteed and funded commission to produce a certain type and quantity of merchandise. In other words, a government guarantee of commercial viability. A major source of bureaucratic power - and corruption. Not only in Russia of course. The leader shouldn't be associated with any of these obviously.
5. Falling down, decrepit (разваливающийся) - we don't want to talk about failure in the face of a man who only wants to be associated with success.
6. Slumping, declining, decadent (упадочный) - same as no. 5
7. Bad (плохой) - probably, same as no.5 and 6.
8. Give me (дайте) - don't pester great men with petty requests and probably same as no.4. Not to be confused with давайте or давай (let's do it, go for it).
9. I want (хочу) - same as no.8
10. Help (помогите) - a hate word of particular significance, especially when used as an offer of help. Michael Dell of Dell Computers learned it the hard way at the Davos Economic Forum earlier this year. Putin, like many Russians, sees offers of help as patronising, unsuitable when talking to a great nation. Watch the video with Putin replying to Dell below.

The list reportedly was compiled by the head of the Federal Agency for Youth Vassily Yakemenko for participants of the Seliger-2009 gathering, an annual national workshop for pro-government young people at a campsite near lake Seliger, 350 km Nort-West of Moscow. Putin visited the event in July this year.

The list of banned words was first reported by the Kommersant, a lively business newspaper, popular not so much for the accuracy of its reporting, but for the tongue-in-cheek style of packaging the news. According to the report Yakemenko said: I am not giving directives, only recommendations. You either follow my recommendations, or you don't speak to Putin.

It is not clear if the list exists as a document or was put together by the Kommersant correspondent himself. In any case, it is claimed that none of the banned words were said during Putin's meetings with the Seliger youth. Exchanges were along the you-love-me-I-love-you lines, says the paper. 'A girl to Putin: 'you are a wonderful leader'. Putin to the girl: 'and you are a beautiful girl'.

When Michael Dell, CEO of Dell computers, asked Putin at Davos what Western IT companies could do to help Russia, it provoked an angry outburst which surprised many. But, as the Fortune/Money CNN Europe Editor Peter Gumbell explained,

Russia has been allergic to offers of aid from the West ever since hundreds of overpaid consultants arrived in Moscow after the collapse of Communism, in 1991, and proceeded to hand out an array of advice that proved, at times, useless or dangerous.
Putin's withering reply to Dell: "We don't need help. We are not invalids. We don't have limited mental capacity." The slapdown took many of the people in the audience by surprise. Putin then went on to outline some of the steps the Russian government has taken to wire up the country, including remote villages in Siberia. And, in a final dig at Dell, he talked about how Russian scientists were rightly respected not for their hardware, but for their software.

The impact of Putin's outburst was considered serious enough for Russia Today, a sleek propaganda satellite TV channel and web-site, to claim, unconvincingly, that Putin's real meaning was 'lost in translation'. Putin's anger and his insistence that Russia did not need help, but would welcome equal partnership, were not.

Here is a video where Putin asks Yakemenko to put an oscillograph for the young inventor on his to do list. ('Vasya! Oscillograph!'):



And here Putin is telling off Michael Dell: